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NOTE
Sidestepping Scott: Modifying Criminal
Discovery in Alaska
This Note analyzes the possibility of instituting reciprocal criminal
discovery in Alaska. It begins by discussing the right against selfincrimination under federal and Alaska law and then traces the
national trend expanding the exchange of information between the
prosecution and defense through mandatory reciprocal discovery
statutes. Next, the Note analyzes Scott v. State, the case in which
the Alaska Supreme Court held that discovery requests by the
prosecution which are testimonial, incriminating, and compelled
violate the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. In light of
the Scott holding, the Note discusses several failed and ineffective
attempts to reform criminal discovery in Alaska, looks to several
other states’ reciprocal discovery systems, and concludes that an
opt-in reciprocal discovery system would be the best option to expand criminal discovery in Alaska.

I. INTRODUCTION
While the rest of the nation has moved gradually toward ex1
panded criminal discovery, the State of Alaska remains behind.
The national move has embraced various forms of reciprocal discovery, which provides for the liberal exchange of information be2
tween the prosecution and the defense. In its purest form, recipCopyright © 1998 by Alaska Law Review
1. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter 1996 STANDARDS]. In
1994, the American Bar Association adopted Criminal Justice Discovery Standards reflecting a significant change from previous standards. The ABA noted
that “since the adoption of the Second Edition Standards, both state and federal
criminal justice systems have continued the trend towards imposing expanded
pretrial discovery obligations on the prosecution and the defense in criminal
cases.” Id. at xv. The new standards removed a “two-track” approach that
“combined limited mandatory discovery with broad additional discovery at the
election of the defense” in favor of an approach that applied mandatory discovery
in all cases. Id. at xvi. The State of Alaska has not adopted this approach.
2. States that have enacted some form of reciprocal discovery include Ari-
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rocal discovery is a “two-way street” wherein the parties exchange
before trial virtually all information short of the attorneys’ work
product. A modified form of reciprocal discovery often referred to
as “opt-in” reciprocal discovery provides greater discovery to the
prosecution but only if the defendant chooses to participate. The
growing acceptance of reciprocal discovery reflects a concern for
fair criminal trials. Generally, without reciprocal discovery, the
defense has access to more information than does the prosecution,
which directly hinders the prosecution from putting on as strong a
case as possible. Reciprocal discovery systems aim to rectify this
imbalance by providing the prosecution with greater discovery access to the defendant’s information.3
Alaskan jurisprudence has never adopted any form of reciprocal discovery. Impeded by the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in
4
Scott v. State, mandatory disclosures by the defendant have been
curtailed to such an extent that true reciprocal discovery is impos5
sible. The legislative attempt to enact reciprocal discovery was ultimately unsuccessful because the reform initiative, Chapter 95,
was found to violate the Scott holding and was therefore ruled un6
constitutional by the Alaska Supreme Court in November of 1997.
A judicial committee initiative to expand criminal discovery does
not reach the level of traditional reciprocal discovery and has yet
to be tested in Alaska courts.
At the heart of the debate in Alaska is how the legislature
may expand criminal discovery between the prosecution and the
defense while remaining consistent with the Scott holding. This
Note suggests that an “opt-in” reciprocal discovery system is desirable for its fairness and even-handed application of the law while
still respecting the Scott holding. The passage of legislation in the
Alaska legislature (although later found unconstitutional) indicates popular support exists for such discovery reform. Part II of
the Note provides a historical background of the right against selfzona, California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, and West Virginia. For example, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§
1054 - 1054.7 (West 1997). See People v. Johnson, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652 (Ct. App.
1992) (stating that the criminal discovery statute “is intended to protect the public
interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts, to promote the [p]eople’s
interest in preventing a last minute defense, and to reduce the risk of judgments
based on incomplete facts”). For a more complete examination of other jurisdictions, see infra Parts II.B & V.B.
3. For a comprehensive view of the arguments concerning the expansion of
defendant-provided discovery, see Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversary Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1986).
4. 519 P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska 1974).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See State v. Summerville, 948 P.2d 469, 470 (Alaska 1997).
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incrimination and examines models of expanded criminal discovery. Part III analyzes the Scott holding, focusing on the constitutional difficulties any reciprocal discovery system will face in
Alaska. Part IV introduces past Alaskan judicial and legislative
attempts to modify criminal discovery, analyzes their conflict with
the Scott holding, and examines and critiques the version of Criminal Rule 16 currently in effect. Part V looks to other jurisdictions
for models of reciprocal discovery that would still satisfy the Scott
holding and concludes that an “opt-in” regime is the most appropriate way for Alaska to reform criminal discovery.
7

II. NEMO TENETUR SEIPSUM PRODERE : EVOLVING STATE
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION
Few rights in the Western legal tradition have as prominent
and erratic a history as the right against self-incrimination. From
the courts of the Anglican Church to the proceedings of the Star
Chamber, legal authorities and scholars have debated the extent to
which persons should be compelled to testify against their own in8
terests. During the founding of our nation, George Mason lobbied the Constitutional Convention to include in the original Constitution a bill of rights that would have embraced protections
against self-incrimination, modeled after rights already guaranteed
9
under the Virginia constitution. When Mason’s efforts failed,
James Madison, in the 1789 Congress, supported calls to establish a
right against self-incrimination in any context, including civil mat10
ters. In its final form, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case
11
to be a witness against himself.” Article I, section 9 of the Alaska
12
Constitution contains virtually identical language. The Alaska
Supreme Court has recognized that the drafters of the Alaska
Constitution looked to the federal Constitution as a model, intending section 9 to guarantee the liberties then available under
13
the U.S. Constitution.
7. No one is bound to betray himself.
8. For a full discussion on the history of the right against self-incrimination,
see MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 1-23 (1980); LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE
AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 9-19 (1959).
9. See BERGER, supra note 8, at 22-23.
10. See id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be compelled in any
criminal proceeding to be a witness against himself.”); see also Biele v. State, 371
P.2d 811 (Alaska 1962).
13. See State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 529-30 (Alaska 1993).
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The right against self-incrimination however is not the only
protection against governmental abuse afforded the accused. The
accused citizen also is entitled to a fair, meaningful trial as a matter
of due process.14 Inherent to a meaningful trial is access to information, particularly the defendant’s access to the prosecutor’s in15
formation through discovery. Protection from self-incrimination
and the assurance of a fair trial often act in concert with each
other, ensuring the accused a fair, informed adjudication. How
these constitutional protections delimit the process of criminal discovery, however, is far from a determined and static concept in
American jurisprudence. In particular, the amount of discovery
that the defense must disclose to the state is an evolving debate.
Difficulties arise when important liberties, such as the right
against self-incrimination, operate in varying degrees and on multiple standards. The Tenth Amendment to the federal Constitution includes a truism regarding sovereignty for the states: “powers
not delegated to the United States, . . . nor prohibited by it to the
[s]tates, are reserved to the [s]tates respectively, or to the peo16
ple.” The Bill of Rights was originally intended to preclude fed17
eral interference with protected rights. Thus, the states were limited only to the extent that similar provisions were written into
their individual state constitutions. However, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process clause, enacted during Reconstruction,
has been interpreted to apply most provisions to the states; this incorporation has continued gradually until nearly all liberties found
18
in the Bill of Rights have been applied to the states.
To the extent that a federal right has been extended to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal courts’ interpretation of the right becomes a baseline, or a bare minimum
amount of protection that the states must provide. However, a
19
higher standard may be adopted by states if they so choose. In
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
15. See Maloney v. State, 667 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). For a
comprehensive discussion of the prosecutorial disclosure duties, see Emily D.
Quinn, Standards of Materiality Governing the Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose
Evidence to the Defense, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 147 (1989).
16. U.S. CONST. amend X.
17. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833) (holding that
the federal Constitution’s Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments have no application to state governments).
18. See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964). For a more detailed account of the incorporation doctrine’s
progression and expansion, see William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
19. See California v. Trombletta, 467 U.S. 479, 491 n.12 (1984) (“[States] re-
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essence, the states may extend greater rights to their respective
citizens if they find the federal baseline to be insufficient. Many
consider an expansion of rights at a state level consistent with, if
not vital to, the concept of federalism.20 When a state elects to expand its citizens’ rights beyond the federal baseline, it must then
decide to what extent it will rely upon federal judicial decisions in
21
interpreting the state’s constitutional stance.
Criminal discovery is an example of this melange of federal
baselines and state expansion of rights. In the early 1970s, the
criminal justice system began to experience a revolution of sorts,
22
particularly as to the rights of the accused. During that time, the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure codified different versions of reciprocal discovery. While the ABA Discovery Standards did not insist
upon the defendant’s participation, it provided for an opt-in component that permitted broader disclosure from the prosecution to
the defendant only if the defendant agreed to reciprocate with
23
similar disclosure. The revised Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically sought to expand defense disclosure by mandating
24
reciprocal discovery. The defendant had no choice in discovery
main free to adopt more rigorous safeguards governing the admissibility of scientific evidence than those imposed by the [f]ederal Constitution.”). Alaskan courts
long have viewed themselves as capable of expanding rights beyond U.S. constitutional constraints: “We are not bound in expounding the Alaska Constitution’s
Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, past
or future, which expound identical or closely similar provisions of the United
States Constitution.” Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969).
20. See generally, e.g., Brennan, supra note 18; Peter J. Galie, Other Supreme
Court Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731
(1982); Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last Frontier,” Professor Gardner:
Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA
L. REV. 1 (1995).
21. See generally Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970)
(analyzing the scope of the right to jury trial under the U.S. and Alaska constitutions). The Alaska Supreme Court has taken the view that it has a “duty to move
forward in those areas of constitutional progress which we view as necessary to
the development of a civilized way of life in Alaska.” Id. at 401. Quoting Justice
Cardozo, the court stated, “‘We take a false and one-sided view of history when
we ignore its dynamic aspects. . . . [Books] cannot teach us that what was the beginning shall also be the end.’” Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW 104-05 (1924)).
22. See FED R. CRIM. P. 16 note to 1974 Amendment; AMERICAN BAR ASS’N,
STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
(Approved Draft, 1970) [hereinafter 1970 STANDARDS].
23. See 1970 STANDARDS, supra note 22, at 43-46.
24. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 note to 1974 Amendment. The new amendments
revised the rule “to give greater discovery to both the prosecution and the de-
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format. In both systems, however, the goal was fairer, more balanced discovery under which constitutional rights were preserved,
and the government received the information it needed to prosecute the defendant fully and fairly.
Various states adopted aspects of this new view of discovery,
and some states began to push beyond the federal norms. For example, the State of Florida required that defendants give notice of
25
an alibi defense. Although the federal rules did not require the
disclosure of alibi witnesses, in a challenge to the constitutionality
of the Florida rule, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute
26
against a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege. Elsewhere, states
continued to expand discovery requirements, a movement that
culminated in the ABA revising its Discovery Standards to support
27
full, mandatory reciprocal discovery in criminal cases.
A. ABA Standards for Reciprocal Discovery
The standards set by the ABA were designed to form the
framework around which the individual states could structure their
own rules. In drafting the new standards, the ABA “sought to
produce a revised set of standards that would be widely implemented across the United States” and adaptable to each jurisdic28
tion’s particular situation. In its purest form, the reciprocal discovery now advanced by the ABA requires equal participation by
the prosecution and defense; it is viewed as a two-way street
whereby information flows freely between the parties. All information, short of work product, is revealed in the pretrial phase,
thus allowing full preparation by each side.
Specifically, the Discovery Standards require the prosecutor
to produce “[a]ll written and oral statements of the defendant or of
any codefendant that are within the possession or control of the
29
prosecution,” as well as “[t]he names and addresses of all persons
known to the prosecution to have information concerning the offense charged, together with all written statements of any such per30
son.” The prosecution must also provide (1) “[a]ny reports or
31
written statements of experts made in connection with the case” ;
fense.” Id. The Advisory Committee felt “that the two — prosecution and defense discovery — are related and that the giving of a broader right of discovery
to the defense is dependent upon giving also a broader right of discovery to the
prosecution.” Id.
25. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a).
26. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
27. See 1996 STANDARDS, supra note 1.
28. Id. at xv.
29. Id. § 11-2.1(a)(i).
30. Id. § 11-2.1(a)(ii).
31. Id. § 11-2.1(a)(iv).
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(2) a list of persons it intends to call as witnesses at trial32; (3) all
tangible objects pertaining to the case, identifying which of these
objects it intends to offer as evidence at trial and which objects it
33
obtained through a search and seizure ; and (4) all prior conviction
records, information relating to lineups, and information obtained
34
from electronic surveillance. Finally, if “the prosecution intends
to use character, reputation, or other act evidence, the prosecution
should notify the defense of that intention and of the substance of
35
the evidence to be used.”
The Discovery Standards likewise demand specific disclosures
from the defense. Under the new standards, the defendant must
provide the following:
[t]he names and addresses of all witnesses (other than the defendant) whom the defense intends to call at trial, together with all
written statements of any such witness that are within the possession or control of the defense and that relate to the subject
36
matter of the testimony of the witness.

The defense must also provide “reports or written statements
made in connection with the case by experts whom the defense intends to call at trial, including the results of physical or mental ex37
aminations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons.”
Additionally, tangible items that will be introduced at trial by the
38
defense must be disclosed to the prosecution.
B. California as a Reciprocal Model
As previously noted, many states have enacted reciprocal dis39
covery statutes. An illustrative example is Chapter 10 of the Cali40
fornia Penal Code. The stated purpose of the California recipro32. See id. § 11-2.1(a)(ii).
33. See id. § 11-2.1(a)(v), (d).
34. See id. § 11-2.1(a)(vi)-(vii), (c).
35. Id. § 11-2.1(b).
36. Id. § 11-2.2(a)(i).
37. Id. § 11-2.2(a)(ii).
38. See id. § 11-2.2(a)(iii).
39. See supra note 2.
40. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054 -1054.7 (West 1997). Chapter 10 was added by
Initiative Measure § 23 (Proposition 115), which was approved on June 5, 1990.
Like Alaska, California was prohibited from enacting reciprocal discovery by an
expansion of state self-incrimination rights under In re Misener, 698 P.2d 637 (Cal.
1985). Rather than selecting an opt-in provision, Proposition 115 attempted to
circumvent the court’s decision by including an amendment to the state constitution that permitted reciprocal discovery. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§1054 -1054.7.
The California Supreme Court found no conflict between the new amendment
and the existing self-incrimination provisions and upheld Proposition 115. See
Izazaga v. Superior Court, 815 P.2d 304, 313-14 (Cal. 1991).
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cal discovery statute is to “promote the ascertainment of truth in
trials by requiring timely pretrial discovery . . . [t]o save court time
in trial and avoid the necessity for frequent interruptions and postponements. . . . [and] [t]o protect victims and witnesses from danger, harassment, and undue delay of the proceedings.”41 The California statute addresses these goals by first listing with specificity
those materials that the prosecuting attorney must disclose. The
required disclosures include the following:
(a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends
to call as witnesses at trial.
(b) Statements of all defendants.
(c) All relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the
investigation of the offenses charged.
(d) The existence of a felony conviction of any material witness
whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the
trial.
(e) Any exculpatory evidence.
(f) Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor in42
tends to call at trial . . . .

The defense is also required to produce discovery, but with
less specificity. The defendant’s disclosures include a list of per43
sons intended to be called “as witnesses at trial” accompanied by
all “relevant written or recorded statements of those persons . . .
including any reports or statements of experts made in connection
44
with the case.” The defense must also provide “[a]ny real evi45
dence that the defendant intends to offer in evidence at trial.”
The California statute is a typical compelled reciprocal discovery system. The defense does not have the choice of opting-in,
but is required to participate in discovery. Section 1054 provides
time limits within which counsel must make the required discovery
46
47
available. The section also protects work product, and applies
48
various sanctions if requests for compliance are unheeded. In return, the defendant is granted much more disclosure than required
by the U.S. Constitution.
As is to be expected, the precise form of a criminal discovery
rule will vary depending on the structure and preferences of each

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.
Id. § 1054.1.
Id. § 1054.3(a).
Id.
Id. § 1054.3(b).
See id. § 1054.7.
See id. § 1054.6.
See id. § 1054.5.
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jurisdiction. Any form of required reciprocal discovery in Alaska,
however, faces serious restrictions, largely due to an unprecedented expansion of self-incrimination rights established by the
Alaska Supreme Court in Scott v. State.49
III. THE IMPEDIMENT TO RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY IN ALASKA:
SCOTT V. STATE
In many respects, Alaska has been a forerunner in granting
50
individual rights above and beyond federal requirements. Broad
interpretations of the Alaska Constitution have expanded the right
51
52
of privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure,
53
and the accused’s right to counsel. However, many have criticized the lack of Alaskan forays into expanding protections against
54
self-incrimination. While these criticisms are valid to a certain
49. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
50. See Nelson, supra note 20, at 11. Nelson illustrates Alaskan examples of
“New Judicial Federalism” in the areas of equal protection, privacy, religious
freedom, and access to natural resources. See id. The Nelson article criticizes
claims made by James Gardner that suggest federalism has produced “a vast
wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.” James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 763 (1992).
The foundation for such judicial behavior may be traced back at least to Baker v.
City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). There, the court stated that,
while we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards imposed
upon us by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop
additional constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitution. . . . We need not stand by idly and passively, waiting for constitutional direction from the highest court of the land. Instead, we should be
moving concurrently to develop and expound the principles embedded
in our constitutional law.
Id. at 401-02 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
51. As opposed to the federal “zones of privacy,” which rest within penumbras from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, as expressed by
the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1965), the
Alaska Constitution specifically provides that “[t]he right of the people to privacy
is recognized and shall not be infringed.” A LASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
52. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 791 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1990) (limiting patdown, warrantless searches and thus rejecting the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727
(Alaska 1979) (expanding limits on preincarceration searches); Woods & Rhode,
Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977) (extending search and seizure protections to commercial property).
53. See Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342-43 (Alaska 1969) (interpreting the
Alaska constitutional provision, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11, to have a broader
scope than the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
54. See generally G. Blair McCune, Self-Incrimination Protection Under the
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extent, they underestimate the significance of the broad expansion
of rights under Scott v. State.55
In Scott, the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed a superior
court’s order that had granted the prosecution’s request for ex56
tremely broad discovery. Stepping far beyond the discovery re57
quirements of Criminal Rule 16(c), the state had required that the
defendant disclose
(1) the names and addresses of all prospective defense witnesses,
other than defendant himself.
(2) the production or inspection and copying of any written or
recorded statements in defendant’s possession of prospective defense or government witnesses, other than defendant himself.
(3) advance notice of an alibi defense, together with information
indicating the place or places defendant claims to have been and
58
the names of witnesses upon whom he intends to rely.

The supreme court found that the trial court’s order was
within the broad latitude “accorded a trial court in the conduct and
59
management of pretrial procedures,” but then focused on what
the court considered the most serious claim — “that the broad
prosecutorial discovery order controvene[d] [the defendant’s]
privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sec60
tion 9 of the Alaska [C]onstitution.”
After an extensive review of the evolution of criminal discov61
ery in the United States and in Alaska, the court ruled that an accused could not be compelled to disclose evidence related to an
alibi defense, including the names and addresses of potential wit62
nesses or statements by those witnesses. However, the court did
permit the state to require defendants to give pretrial notification
63
that they might present an alibi defense.
In its decision, the court relied not on the Fifth Amendment to
Alaska Constitution: A Descriptive Analysis, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 43 (1995).
McCune criticizes Alaskan efforts in, inter alia, the areas of right to counsel, custody, Miranda waivers, voluntariness, and interrogation. See id. at 58-69. In these
areas, McCune suggests, “Alaska courts are generally reluctant to grant broader
protection for self-incrimination rights under the Alaska Constitution than that
afforded by the [f]ederal Constitution.” Id. at 58.
55. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
56. See id. at 775.
57. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c).
58. Scott, 519 P.2d at 775.
59. Id. at 777.
60. Id. (footnotes omitted).
61. See id. at 778-83.
62. See id. at 786-87.
63. See id. at 787.
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the U.S. Constitution, but on article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution. Divergence from federal construction was necessary due
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Williams v. Florida.64 The
Williams Court, judging facts similar to those of Scott, ruled that
the U.S. Constitution does not provide protection against disclos65
ing alibi witnesses. The Supreme Court stated that a trial is “not
yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always
66
to conceal their cards until played.” Focusing on the inevitable
disclosure of the discovery items, the Court noted that the criminal
rules “only compel[] [a defendant] to accelerate the timing of his
disclosure, forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information
that the [defendant] from the beginning planned to divulge at
67
trial.” With respect to the Fifth Amendment, the Court held
that “[n]othing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant . . . to await the end of the [s]tate’s case before announcing
68
the nature of his defense.”
The Alaska Supreme Court refused to apply the Williams
holding to self-incrimination rights enumerated under article I,
69
section 9 of the Alaska Constitution. In rejecting the reasoning of
Williams, the court held that “the privilege against compelled selfincrimination under the Alaska Constitution prohibits extensive
70
The
pretrial prosecutorial discovery in criminal proceedings.”
court applied a three-part test, disallowing discovery of informa71
tion that is (1) testimonial, (2) incriminating, and (3) compelled.
Applying this test to Mr. Scott’s situation, the court first found that
the discovery was indeed testimonial since the witness list
“constitutes a communication of cognizable information from one
72
source to another.” Second, the disclosure was also incriminating
to the extent that the released alibi information may reference
“known felons, perjurers, accomplices, co-defendants, or individuals under suspicion or surveillance . . . . Moreover, the police may
possess additional incriminating information about some of the
witnesses and an accused’s reference . . . may tend to implicate him
64. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
65. See id. at 83.
66. Id. at 82.
67. Id. at 85.
68. Id.
69. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 778 (Alaska 1974).
70. Id. at 785.
71. The court flatly applied this three-part test without reference to any
source from which it derived this standard. See id. All three parts of this test
must be met in order to prohibit discovery. See Gipson v. State, 609 P.2d 138
(Alaska 1980) (finding that the evidence at issue was incriminating and compelled, but not testimonial, and therefore was discoverable).
72. Scott, 519 P.2d at 785.
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in criminal activities of such witness.”73 Finally, the court found
that since the discovery was required by a court order, it was in74
deed compelled.
Addressing the U.S. Supreme Court’s “eventuality of disclosure” argument, the Alaska court offered a counter-scenario in
which “the state’s case may be so weak that the defendant will
choose not to expose himself to further criminal liability by revealing incriminating evidence that was nonetheless exculpatory of
75
the crime for that he stands charged.” The Scott court was simply
unwilling to be limited to a federal baseline which it perceived as
76
an insufficient protection of citizens’ rights. The court stated,
“We are not bound to follow blindly a federal constitutional construction of a fundamental principle if we are convinced that the
77
result is based on unsound reason or logic.”
In addition to being a sharp departure from the federal interpretation of rights, Scott foreclosed the possibility of adopting
mandatory reciprocal discovery in Alaska. Any change in discovery requirements must not require disclosures that are testimonial,
incriminating, and compelled. The subsequent efforts to enact reciprocal discovery measures have merely challenged the founda78
tion of Scott and therefore have failed. Successful reform must
work within the Scott constraints while still providing for more fair,
even-handed criminal discovery.
IV. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
Under the former versions of Rule 16, discovery in Alaska
was not reciprocal. Instead, it provided for extensive discovery to
the defense, but the prosecution had to wait until the trial for
79
revelation of certain persons’ identities, testimonies, and reports.
Despite the restrictions on discovery by the prosecution established by Scott, Alaska has attempted moves toward a fairer, more

73. Id.
74. See id. at 786.
75. Id. at 787.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 783.
78. See infra Part IV.
79. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16 (1973). Under this version of Rule 16, the
prosecutor was required to disclose the “names and addresses of persons known
by the government to have knowledge of relevant facts and their written or recorded statements.” Id. The prosecution was also required to disclose any statements made by the defendant or any codefendant and any expert reports made in
relation to the case. See id. In return, the defendant was to provide notice of intent to raise an insanity defense and court-ordered expert witness reports, and to
submit to nontestimonial identification procedures. See id.
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reciprocal discovery.
A. Efforts from the Judiciary
In 1995, the Alaska Department of Law proposed a version of
reciprocal criminal discovery moderated by an “opt-in/opt-out”
80
provision. Defendants who agreed to opt-in would receive discovery from the prosecution pursuant to that provided by Criminal
81
In return, the defense would waive self-incrimination
Rule 16.
privileges and would be required to present the prosecution with
more extensive discovery than they would be under Scott, including a notice of defenses, names and addresses of potential wit82
nesses, statements from witnesses, and expert witness reports. A
defendant who chooses to opt out would lose access to discovery
from the prosecution provided by Criminal Rule 16 and would be
83
limited to the discovery rights under the Little Jencks Act. Under
this Act, which governs discovery during trial as opposed to pretrial, the prosecution is required to provide only statements made
by prosecution witnesses once those witnesses have testified either
84
in preliminary hearings or in the trial itself. With no other discovery standards, this system would largely abrogate pretrial discovery in the criminal context except for exculpatory evidence
85
which the prosecution is constitutionally bound to disclose.
The majority of the Alaska Supreme Court Criminal Rules
Committee voted against adopting the opt-in/opt-out reciprocal
discovery proposal. The Committee’s primary concern was the
problems created by defendants who choose to opt out. The
Committee asserted in its report “that no incentive existed for a
86
defendant to choose to opt into such a discovery process.” To
substantiate this assertion, the report stated that
80. See Alaska Department of the Law, Proposed Rule Changes to Criminal
Rule 16, at 18 (1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Proposed Rule Changes].
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See ALASKA STAT. §§12.45.050-.080 (Michie 1996); see also Proposed Rule
Changes, supra note 80, at 18. The “Little Jencks Act” was modeled after the
federal Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 et seq. (1994). The Alaska Supreme Court
has previously held that the Alaska model does not conflict with Criminal Rule 16
as the Rule addresses pretrial discovery, while the Act speaks only to discovery
during trial. See Putnam v. State, 629 P.2d 35, 44 n.19 (Alaska 1980).
84. See 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 95.
85. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
86. Memorandum from Marcia E. Holland, for the majority of the Alaska Supreme Court Criminal Rules Committee, to the Alaska Supreme Court 1 (Dec.
12, 1994) (on file with author) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material . . . to guilt.”).
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[a] majority of criminal defense attorneys contacted by committee
members indicated that they would prefer operating under an
opt-out procedure if given the choice between opt-in or opt-out
procedure. Little incentive existed under the state’s proposal for
a defendant to choose to waive his/her privilege against self87
incrimination and opt into the reciprocal discovery process.

Since the opt-in procedure was undesirable to the defense attorneys polled, the report then moved to the problems “which
arise when the criminal justice system operates solely or primarily
on discovery provided by the state under the provisions of the Lit88
tle Jencks Act.” Concerns included the potential for unreliable
results, conflicts of representation, mid-trial delays, and the probability of prosecution continuing to release discovery in the inter89
est of pre-indictment procedures.
The Committee concluded by discussing the “broader impact
of the opt-out procedure on the smooth functioning of a criminal
90
justice system.” In its opinion, the opt-out discovery procedure
91
would have “a significant adverse effect on the court system.” In
particular, the report listed the difficulties faced by an opt-out defendant who lacks vital information, a jury delayed by required
continuances, or a prosecution strained by an increasing number of
92
preliminary hearings.
Under the proposal, the defendant who chooses to opt out of
reciprocal discovery has little access to discovery material important to deciding trial strategy. A defendant who lacks disclosure of
the evidence “lacks the perspective to make an informed decision
to either go to trial or not and the defense attorney lacks the evidence to back up an explanation to a client concerning the client’s
93
chances for an acquittal at trial.” Without the materials for a
meaningful defense, the majority anticipated less negotiation and
pretrial resolution, resulting in more cases going to trial and
greater demands for juries.
The majority report predicted there would also be an adverse
impact on juries. Mid-trial delays would frequently arise as defendants request continuances to counter new evidence. Trial lengths
would become less predictable. These continuances would strain
the jurors’ ability to serve. As one judge lamented, “it is very difficult to be able to hold on to a jury when a mid-trial delay of six

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2.
See id. at 2-3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
See id. at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
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weeks or more occurs.”94
Finally, the majority report predicted that if the proposal were
adopted, preliminary hearings would again become a discovery
tool. Preliminary hearings were a frequent occurrence under for95
mer versions of Rule 16. In response to prosecutorial tactics, defendants would use pretrial motions to gain discovery, a technique
common in federal courts. Responding to these motions would
burden Alaska’s court systems and already-overworked prosecutorial staffs. In light of its findings, the majority of the Criminal
Rules Committee rejected the proposed rule, concluding that “optin/opt-out reciprocal discovery procedures could result in disrup96
tive pretrial and trial practice and in burdening the system.”
While the majority reflected a preference for the current, prodefendant system, the minority favored an approach that would either restrict defendant access to materials or broaden prosecutorial
97
reach. The minority report favored an “opt-in” version of reciprocal discovery, finding it an “exchange of information” that would
“result in trials with more reliable results – i.e.[,] the guilty will not
98
go free because the accused sandbagged the prosecution.” Raising issue with the majority’s prediction of increased trial numbers,
the minority cited the federal court system as an example of effective reciprocal discovery. According to the minority, “the number
of trials vs. pleas [under the federal reciprocal discovery system] is
99
not unmanageable.” The minority also asserted that the federal
courts have not seen a large number of mid-trial continuances dis100
rupting the judicial process. However, the minority provided no
101
empirical data to support this assertion.
The minority suggested that the number of trials may actually
decrease when the “defendants’ chances of winning at trial by am102
As for increased collateral attacks, it
bush are removed.”
pointed to the large percentage of convicted defendants already
filing for post-conviction relief and argued that the proposed rule
94. Id.
95. See id. at 5.
96. Id.
97. The crucial ideological division between the majority and minority reports
is evidenced by the fact that the majority was written by Assistant Public Defender Marcia E. Holland, while the minority report was written by Assistant Attorney General Cynthia M. Hora.
98. Memorandum from Cynthia M. Hora, for the minority of the Alaska Supreme Court Criminal Rules Committee, to Christine Johnson, Court Rules Attorney 2-3 (Dec. 8, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hora Memorandum].
99. Id. at 2.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
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“may change the specific complaints about a trial attorney’s performance, but it will not have any impact on the number of postconviction relief applications filed.”103
In examining the merits of reciprocal discovery, the Committee as a whole addressed several issues crucial to advancing the
Alaskan criminal system toward a fairer discovery format. However, the actual viability of reciprocal discovery in Alaska is still
unclear. In discussing reform measures, the Committee focused on
the negative effects that defendants who opt out might encounter.
While analysis of these effects are necessary, the examination was
premature. The majority report largely dismissed any notion that
defendants would actually opt in with regularity. Its discussion revolved around why the Rule’s failure would be negative, rather
than discussing if the Rule would fail. Neither side presented reliable or credible evidence to support its respective thesis. Although
it may be true that the proposal’s effects are unknown or unconsidered, both sides, rather than entertaining any true research or
investigation, drew conclusions based on their differing ideologies
of criminal law.
Both sides also predictably raised by implication the specter of
institutional competence: whether the ideological and political aspect of the debate appropriately belongs in judicial committees, or
whether such a question is best left to a more politically accountable branch of government – the legislature. Reciprocal discovery
proponents have argued that the movement has grown out of the
public backlash against crime and the perception that flaws in the
104
criminal justice system unduly favor the accused. The minority
drew on this sentiment in its statement that “[t]he public is de105
manding a fair trial for both the accused and the government.”
This assertion, however, was presented on its own merits and was
not grounded in neutral, unbiased research.
Notwithstanding its rejection of reciprocal discovery, the
Criminal Rules Committee did pass modifications to Criminal
Rule 16 in an attempt to broaden discovery as much as possible
106
within the limitations set by Scott. The revisions to the discovery
rule included mandatory defense disclosure of expert witnesses,
defenses, and physical evidence, while prosecution disclosure re-

103. Id.
104. See id. at 2; see also 1996 STANDARDS, supra note 1, at xv. The ABA Discovery Standards suggest that “[t]here has . . . been a growing recognition on the
state and federal levels that expanded pretrial discovery in criminal cases is beneficial to both parties and promotes the fair administration of the criminal justice
system.” Id.
105. Hora Memorandum, supra note 98, at 2.
106. See generally Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 80.
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mained largely unchanged.107
Under the new Rule 16, defendants are required to present to
the prosecutor not only reports and statements of expert witnesses
(as was the previous practice), but also the names and addresses of
expert witnesses who are likely to be called. Additionally, the defense, at least ten days prior to trial, must “inform the prosecutor
of the defendant’s intention to rely upon a defense of alibi, justification, duress, entrapment, or other statutory or affirmative de108
The previous rule had limited mandatory disclosure to
fense.”
109
Finally, the revisions
defendants asserting an insanity defense.
now require defendants to “turn over . . . any physical evidence of
110
the offense received by counsel.” The defense counsel could not
be “compelled to provide any information concerning the source
of the evidence” nor could the prosecutor “reveal the source of the
111
evidence to the jury.”
Without regard to the specific discovery formats preferred,
both factions of the Committee focused on broadening the defendant’s disclosures in an effort to achieve fairer, more liberal criminal discovery. However, the Committee’s reform was limited to
the Scott restrictions; as the Committee’s report states, “Rule 16(c)
should be revised to require [only] as much disclosure as is permit112
ted by law.”
But the new Criminal Rule 16 had little immediate impact; the
legislature, perhaps feeling unsatisfied by the Committee’s lack of
progress, attempted to resolve the matter by legislatively amending
Criminal Rule 16 the following year.
B. Efforts from the Legislature
The latest attempt to reform criminal discovery in Alaska was
the passage of Chapter 95 of the 1996 Session Laws, which
amended Criminal Rule 16 to expand the discovery required of de113
The amendments provided for mandatory reciprocal
fendants.
discovery, including requiring the defense to furnish the identities
and addresses of all prospective witnesses. Effective July 1, 1996,
this Act directly challenged the basic tenets of Scott.
The most crucial revision to Criminal Rule 16, provision
(c)(1), mandated disclosure to the prosecution of “the names, addresses, and phone numbers . . . of persons the defendant is likely
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id.
Id. at 19.
See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16 (1973).
Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 80, at 19.
Id.
Id. at 18.
1996 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 95, § 1.
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to call as witnesses.”114 The former version of Rule 16 required no
115
The new rule also required
such disclosures from the defense.
notification “if the defendant is likely to rely upon a defense of alibi, justification, duress, entrapment, or other statutory or affirma116
tive defenses.”
The first judicial review of Chapter 95 found the revision to
117
Criminal Rule 16 unconstitutional. The state had charged David
Summerville with two counts of sexual assault and one count of
118
sexual abuse of a minor. Under the newly-amended version of
Criminal Rule 16, the state requested discovery information in119
cluding a list of alibi witnesses. Summerville sought a protective
order, claiming the disclosure of defense witnesses, the production
or inspection of statements of any prospective witnesses, and disclosure of an alibi location and witnesses all violated the Scott re120
strictions on prosecutorial discovery. The superior court agreed
and granted the protective order, concluding that “certain portions
of Rule 16(c) . . . stand in direct violation of Scott, which expressly
held that the Alaska Constitution’s bar against compulsory selfincrimination forbids these forms of court-ordered defense disclo121
sure.”
On review, the court of appeals affirmed.122 Dismissing the
state’s contentions that federal case law disagreed with Scott’s
holding, it stated that
[t]hese precedents decided under the [f]ederal Constitution,
have no direct effect on the Alaska Supreme Court’s interpretation of Alaska’s constitution. They may, of course, provide occasion for the Alaska Supreme Court to reexamine the decision it
reached . . . . But unless and until the Alaska Supreme Court revises Scott, its decision in that case remains binding on the supe123
rior court and on this court alike.

In a brief, yet pointed, decision, the Alaska Supreme Court
upheld the court of appeals’s decision and explicitly declined to
124
overrule Scott. It declared the new discovery standards unconsti-

114. Id.
115. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c) (1973).
116. 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 95, § 1.
117. See State v. Summerville, 926 P.2d 465 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996), aff’d, 948
P.2d 469 (Alaska 1997).
118. See id. at 466.
119. See id. at 466-67.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 466-67.
122. See id. at 467.
123. Id.
124. See State v. Summerville, 948 P.2d. 469, 469-70 (Alaska 1997).
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tutional and reinstated the previous Alaska Criminal Rule 16.125
The court held that
[t]he decision in this case is controlled by Scott v. State, unless we
126
are persuaded to overrule Scott. In State v. Dunlop, we stated:
“We do not lightly overrule our past decisions. . . . [I]t is a
‘salutary policy to follow past decisions.’ . . . [W]here we are
‘clearly convinced the rule was originally erroneous or is no
longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good
than harm would result from a departure from precedent,’ we
will so depart.” We are not persuaded that these standards are
met, at least with respect to Scott’s holding that the production
of the names of non-alibi witnesses and their statements cannot
be constitutionally compelled. Because the reciprocal discovery
provisions enacted in section 1 of Chapter 95 SLA 1996 are
non-severable, and at least one of those provisions violates article I, section 9 of Alaska’s constitution, the entire section is invalid. The pre-existing version of Alaska Criminal Rule 16 must
127
remain in effect.

C. Current Law
By declaring Chapter 95 unconstitutional, the Summerville
opinion reinstated the Committee’s Rule 16 as the operative
128
That rule demands
criminal discovery procedure for Alaska.
greater disclosure by the defense, including notification of seemingly all defenses, revelation of expert witness identities, and pro129
duction of all physical evidence held by the defense.
125. See id.
126. Here, the court appears to suggest it might overrule Scott should a sufficient argument be presented. It is unclear what arguments would persuade the
court to overrule its decision in the present situation. The brevity of the Summerville opinion suggests the court does not view Scott as “originally erroneous.” As
Scott itself defied a federal move away from broadened self-incrimination rights,
the “changed conditions” possibility seems slight. Thus, we are left to believe the
strongest possibility of overruling Scott lies in showing “more good than harm
would result from a departure from precedent.” Id. at 469. The presentation of
results from other jurisdictions may well be the starting place for such a showing.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 470.
129. The Rule 16 amendments proposed by the Committee were adopted by
the Alaska Supreme Court, effective July 15, 1995. See Alaska Supreme Court
Order No. 1191. The amendments themselves largely affected discovery that the
accused was required to provide to the prosecution.
Under Rule 16(4) as amended, “the defendant [is to] inform the prosecutor of the
names and addresses of any expert witnesses the defendant is likely to call at trial.
Defendant shall also make available for inspection and copying any reports or
written statements of these experts.” ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(4). The new Rule
16(5) requires that “the defendant shall inform the prosecutor of the defendant’s
intention to rely upon a defense of alibi, justification, duress, entrapment, or
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While not allowing for the discovery of alibi witness identities,
the Scott court did allow discovery of a defendant’s intent to use an
alibi defense.130 The court stated that it found “it difficult to conceive how a notice of this particular defense, standing by itself,
131
might tend to be incriminating.” It seems probable that the addition of other defenses to the discovery requirement would follow a
similar evaluation and be upheld.
Providing the identity of expert witnesses also seems proper.
While facially similar to the discovery disallowed by Scott, the production of expert witnesses is distinguishable. Scott emphasized
that alibi witnesses may include “felons, perjurers, accomplices,
codefendants, or individuals under suspicion or police surveillance” that “may tend to implicate [the accused] in the criminal activities of such witness” and may provide “a link in the chain of
132
evidence.” Such potential problems do not exist within the context of expert witnesses. Hence, expert witness testimony, while
perhaps revealing, is not “incriminating” in the same way that alibi
witness testimony is.
V. LOOKING TO OTHER STATES’ MODELS FOR FUTURE EFFORTS
In the wake of Scott and Summerville, Criminal Rule 16 cannot require that the defendant disclose evidence that is testimonial,
incriminating, and compelled. But, if the required disclosure
meets only two of the three prongs, the Alaska Supreme Court’s
133
decision in Gipson v. State suggests such disclosure would not
other statutory or affirmative defense.” Id. 16(5). Under both of these amendments, sanctions are provided for noncompliance.
Finally, the amended Rule 16(6) states that
[d]efense counsel shall turn over to the prosecutor any physical evidence
of the offense received by counsel. If the physical evidence is received
from the attorney’s client or acquired as a direct result of information
communicated by the client, defense counsel may not be compelled to
provide any information concerning the source of the evidence or the
manner in which it was obtained. In such cases, the prosecutor may not
reveal the source of the evidence to the jury. If the source of the physical evidence is not the client or the client’s agent, defense counsel shall
reveal the manner in which the physical evidence was obtained unless
that information is otherwise prohibited.
Id. 16(6).
130. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 787 (Alaska 1974).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 785.
133. 609 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1980). In Gipson, the court distinguished Scott,
finding that the compelled production of a firearm expert’s report satisfied all
prongs but the testimonial portion. The court found the report to be more “akin
to evidence such as fingerprints, handwriting exemplars or photographs. . . . The
non-testimonial nature of the challenged evidence is fatal to Gipson’s constitutional argument.” Id. at 1044 (citation omitted).
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violate the Scott standard. Reform measures, therefore, should focus not on challenging the validity of Scott, but should focus on
sidestepping Scott by avoiding at least one of the three elements.
The Scott court spoke only to what it characterized as
“extensive pretrial prosecutorial discovery in criminal proceed134
While the court spoke against discovery as a “two-way
ings.”
135
street,” it is unclear whether an “opt-in” reciprocal discovery system would be contrary to the ruling. Certainly any compelled reciprocal discovery would violate Scott’s reading of the Alaska Constitution. However, if the defendant waives his Scott rights in
order to gain broader access to prosecution materials, the disclosure would no longer be compelled. Thus, it would appear that an
opt-in reciprocal discovery would satisfy the Scott holding.
As discussed previously, the Criminal Rules Committee rejected a reciprocal discovery proposal because defense attorneys,
informally polled, expressed the opinion that such discovery would
136
not be widely accepted by defendants. Such an informal, unscientific poll should not be the basis for rejecting a progressive and
widely accepted legal movement.
Because Chapter 95 has been ruled unconstitutional, the
Alaska legislature must take the initiative and pass appropriate re137
ciprocal discovery measures. As demonstrated by their previous
attempt, the Criminal Rules Committee is unlikely to enact such
changes due to the members’ contrasting roles within the criminal
justice system. Ideologies will not be set aside easily on such a crucial matter. If, as asserted by the minority report, the people of
138
Alaska are demanding changes in the criminal rules, the legislature is the proper forum for such changes. However, regardless of
the public outcry, and short of amending the Alaska Constitution,
the legislative efforts must remain within the confines of the Scott
decision.

134. Scott, 519 P.2d at 785.
135. Id. at 784.
136. See supra Part IV.A.
137. The Alaska Constitution grants the primary responsibility for rule-making
to the Alaska Supreme Court with secondary rule-making to the legislature:
The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts. It shall make and promulgate rules governing
practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all courts. These
rules may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house.
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §15.
138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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A. Difficulties in Adopting the California or ABA Models
139
The California rule can only serve as a model of pure reciprocal discovery but not the actual discovery regime that might be
enacted in Alaska. Applying the Scott three-part test to the California statute makes it clear that it would be deemed unconstitutional in Alaska. In particular, the required production of witness
140
lists parallels the disclosure required by Chapter 95, a requirement that did not withstand scrutiny under the Scott test, due to
the testimonial, incriminating, and compelled nature of the discov141
ery.
Of particular significance to the present Alaska debate, the
ABA Standards require that “[i]f the defense intends to rely upon
a defense of alibi or insanity, the defense should notify the prosecution of that intent and of the names of the witnesses who may be
142
called in support of that defense.” This provision alone demonstrates the difficulties facing Alaskan reform. Although placed in
the Discovery Standards as merely “another set of witnesses to be
disclosed,” the list of alibi witnesses parallels those discovery requirements in Scott that the supreme court found unconstitu143
tional. Any attempt to include a list of alibi witnesses in the required defense disclosures would require an opt-in procedure to
sidestep the Scott restrictions.
Notably, the ABA removed “opt-in” provisions found in the
“two-track” approach of the previous edition, choosing what it
deemed “a simpler approach which applies the same mandatory
144
discovery rules in all cases.” It is also noteworthy that while the
new Discovery Standards do not provide specific timing guide145
lines, jurisdictions should “impose time limits for discovery sufficiently in advance of trial to give each party adequate time to use
146
the disclosed information to prepare its case.”
An Alaskan measure might well follow the same legislative
pattern of specifically delineating the discovery materials required
by each party. The difficulty in analogizing or closely tracking the

139. See supra Part II.B.
140. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 1997).
141. See State v. Summerville, 926 P.2d 465 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996), aff’d, 948
P.2d 469 (Alaska 1997).
142. 1996 STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 11-2.2(c).
143. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 786-87 (Alaska 1974) (holding that the
portion of the superior court’s order that requires production of alibi information
from the defendant offends the defendant’s state constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination).
144. 1996 STANDARDS, supra note 1, at xvi.
145. See id. § 11-4.1.
146. Id. § 11-4.1(a) commentary.
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enactments of any other jurisdiction stems from Alaska’s unique
expansion of self-incrimination rights. No other state is required
to include an “opt-in” provision to overcome constitutional restrictions. For this reason, the Alaska statute would be unique. Opting-in, however, is not an untested concept in other jurisdictions.
B. North Dakota and Florida as Possible Opt-In Models
Several states continue to provide an opt-in component to
criminal discovery. These states can be models for Alaskan attempts to expand discovery while remaining within Scott’s expansion of self-incrimination rights. In examining two of these jurisdictions, North Dakota and Florida, Alaskan reformers should
note the operation and structure of the opt-in provision and the
disclosure provided in situations where defendants choose not to
opt-in.
North Dakota, with a few notable exceptions, has followed the
national trend toward broader criminal discovery. Prior to 1983,
criminal discovery “proceeded on an informal basis,” requiring
prosecutorial disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence only as
147
In September of
required by the Brady v. Maryland decision.
1983, Rule 16 was amended to permit greater discovery, but only if
148
Specifically, Rule
the defendant chose such discovery.
16(b)(1)(A) provides for disclosure of documents, tangible objects,
and reports of examinations and tests, but only “[i]f the defendant,
in writing, requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or
149
(D).” The cited subdivision states that “[u]pon written request
of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph” an assortment of materials, including virtually all related documents, examinations, and
150
tangible objects. After making the request, the defendant must
151
release to the prosecution the same sort of discovery articles.
Besides providing for opt-in reciprocal discovery, the North
Dakota amendments broaden the discovery available to the prosecution, even if the defendant chooses not to opt-in. For instance,
the defense must disclose all statements made by the defendant
152
Another interand a copy of the defendant’s criminal record.
esting feature of the North Dakota rule requires a “defendant who
147. 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963) (holding that the defendant was not denied a
federal constitutional right when his trial was restricted to the question of punishment); see N.D.R. CRIM. P. 16 explanatory note.
148. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 16 explanatory note.
149. Id. 16(b)(1)(A).
150. Id. 16(a)(1)(C)-(D).
151. See id. 16(b)(1)(A)-(B).
152. See id.
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intends to offer evidence of an alibi defense . . . [to] serve written
notice upon the prosecuting attorney of that intention.”153 The rule
also requires the filing of a notice that states “the specific place or
places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of
the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses
154
upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish the alibi.”
In a slightly clearer fashion, the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure also permit reciprocal discovery, should the defendant
choose it. Through a system entitled “Notice of Discovery,” a
Florida defendant “may elect to participate in the discovery proc155
ess provided by these rules” by filing a notice with the court. The
rule further specifies that “[p]articipation by a defendant in the
discovery process, including the taking of any deposition by a de156
fendant, shall be an election to participate in discovery.”
Once the discovery process is chosen, the defendant is required to furnish a number of items, including witness lists, state157
Most notable, however, is the degree to
ments, and reports.
which the defendant is made available to the prosecution. Having
submitted to discovery, the court may require the defendant to
appear in a lineup, speak for identification by witnesses, be fingerprinted, pose for photographs, try on articles of clothing, permit
the taking of specimens of material from under the defendant’s
fingernails, permit the taking of samples of blood and hair, provide
handwriting samples, and submit to physical and mental inspec158
tions. In exchange for furnishing this information, the defendant
159
is eligible to receive similar information from the prosecution.
Both the North Dakota and Florida versions of the opt-in reciprocal discovery may be useful in selecting appropriate standards
for Alaskan measures. The concept of a formal notice filing, combined with certain acts that may be deemed acts of acceptance,
provide a structure and procedure worthy of consideration. Further, following the North Dakota example of providing broadened
discovery for the prosecution, even if the defendant decides not to
opt-in, may bring a stronger sense of fairness to any proposed rule.
One element that may not be duplicated, however, is the required
release of alibi witnesses from all defendants. Should the defendant not choose to opt-in to reciprocal discovery and thus waive

153. Id. 12.1(a).
154. Id.
155. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a).
156. Id.
157. See id. 3.220(d)(1).
158. See id. 3.220(c)(1). These requirements are recognized by the rule to be
constrained by constitutional limitations. See id.
159. See id. 3.220(b).
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article I, section 9 rights, the Scott decision would prohibit such a
requirement.160
Regardless of the specific provisions and system selected,
Alaskan efforts to enact reciprocal discovery statutes should borrow one aspect from the other states: restricting prosecution discovery to the constitutional minimum unless the accused provides
discovery in return. Within this debate, it must be remembered
that while discovery is widely used, and is now fully ingrained in
the judicial mindset, most discovery provided to the defense by the
prosecution is not constitutionally mandated. Discovery may be
sharply curtailed from its present state. When prosecution materials are no longer regularly provided, reciprocal discovery becomes
much more attractive to the defendant. Through the addition of
an opt-in provision, the reciprocity becomes not only attractive to
the defendant, but also constitutional under Scott v. State.
VI. CONCLUSION
Evolution and change, mitigated by the recognition of individual rights, are fundamental aspects of the Western legal tradition. The last twenty years have seen large changes in the area of
criminal procedure. Whereas the middle of the century was characterized by the extension, development, and refinement of individual rights, the end of this era has brought a resurgence of public
demand for increased crime prevention and less favorable treatment of criminal defendants. With respect to pretrial discovery in
the criminal context, the trend is toward reducing defense access
and increasing prosecutorial access. Such trends have not occurred
in Alaska because of the expansion of criminal defendant’s rights
in Scott v. State. Defendants in Alaska possess greater freedoms
and liberties, stemming not from federal decrees, but from state
judicial activism. By declaring such opinions to be interpretations
of the Alaska Constitution, the Alaska Supreme Court’s decisions
are changeable only upon supreme court initiative or by the
amendment process.
However, this protection of personal freedoms and liberties
through the expansion of self-incrimination rights is hindering fair
criminal prosecution in Alaska. The Department of Law’s recent
proposal examined reciprocal systems where opt-in provisions
would allow increased prosecutorial discovery while respecting
Scott’s expansion of individual rights, but the concept was dismissed largely for ideological reasons. The legislative effort directly challenged the Scott holding by amending Rule 16. However, the Alaska supreme court upheld Scott and the attempt was

160. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974).

07/17/98 9:38 AM

WILLIAMS

58

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[15:1

futile. All previous attempts at reciprocal discovery have extended
the prosecutorial reach to items that the courts view as testimonial
and incriminating, and thus, in Alaska, not constitutionally subject
to be compelled during pretrial discovery. The current version of
Rule 16 remains within the basic tenets of Scott but fails to expand
discovery to any significant degree.
In looking for areas in which to modify criminal procedure,
proponents ought to reconsider an opt-in reciprocal discovery system. They system should pass constitutional muster, under both
the federal and state constitutions, if it restricts defense discovery
to the constitutional and Little Jencks Act minimum should the defendant choose not to opt-in. Broad discovery would not be eliminated, but placed behind a door that the defendant could open at
his or her option. Discussions of this type have previously been
frustrated by insufficient data and argument in improper fora. The
Alaska legislature should decide whether modified reciprocal discovery is an appropriate method of criminal law reform. With an
opt-in provision, Alaska could sidestep the court’s restrictions in
Scott, and rejoin the national legal trend towards more fair and
equal criminal discovery.
Cameron J. Williams

